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Statement of the Nature of the Case 
This is an action in which plaintiff sought division 
of real estate and in which the court below entered summary judgment 
against appellant Ensign Company in the sum of $98,000.00. 
Disposition of Appeal Following Prior Hearing 
This appeal was premised upon multiple grounds involving 
both due process considerations and interpretations of a Judgment 
on Stipulation of July 23, 1971. The appeal was argued orally on 
September 13, 1978; and on October 23, 1978, the Court filed a 
written opinion, concurred in by all Justices, affirming the 
Judgment below. 
Appellant seeks rehearing before this Court on the important 
issue of whether a party's due process rights are invaded when his 
attorney, without the party's knowledge or consent, enters into a 
Stipulated Judgment compromising the claims of the party. 
At pages 12-15 of Appellant's Brief, appellant persuasively 
showed that a well-recognized rule with which this Court agrees 
holds that an attorney may not compromise his client's substantive 
claims without consent, and that an unauthorized stipulation 
doing so is not enforceable. This rule rests on the due process 
clauses of the United States and Utah Constitution. 
The Court Failed to Consider That Part of the Record 
Which Clearly Showed Appellant Raised Below the Issue 
of Lack of Authority 
-2-
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This Court declined to consider appellant's due process 
argument on the ground that appellant failed to raise the issue 
of non-authorization in the district court: 
Defendant, Ensign, further contends he is not bound by 
the 1971 Judgment on Stipulation on the ground he had 
not authorized his attorney to do so. Defendant raises 
this matter for the first time on appeal. The record 
herein includes the hearing held on February 27 and 28 
1975; counsel specifically represented his appearance ' 
was for defendant, Ensign. Counsel did not assert at 
that time Ensign had not authorized the stipulation. 
Thereafter, Ensign has been represented in several 
hearings including the one for summary judgment, and 
such an assertion has not been made. Ensign did not 
make such a claim in his affidavit to support his pleadin~ 
in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Where 
a party neither raises an issue in its pleadings nor 
presents it to the trial court, the issue cannot be 
considered for the first time on appeal.l 
Slip Opinion at 6. 
Appellant respectfully submits that this ground overlooks 
crucial parts of the record before the Court. First, the failure 
of the attorney who purported to represent appellant at the February 
27 and 28, 1975 hearing to raise the issue of lack of authority shou: 
make no difference -- the attorney who appeared at that hearing is 
the same attorney who agreed to the Judgment on Stipulation without 
appellant's knowledge or consent. It is clear from the record 
that appellant had no notice of that February hearing, and indeed 
had no notice of any proceedings until he was served in California 
on September 28, 1976 with a Notice of Entry of Sister State 
Judgment. (R. 814, App. 66) • 
.!/ Hanover Limited v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977). 
-3-
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Second, appellant did raise before the district court the 
issue of lack of notice. After being served with the Notice of Entry 
of Sister State Judgment, he hired a different attorney (Mr. Bennett) 
(R. 806, App. 60). Under Mr. Bennett's direction, an affidavit of 
Robert Ensign was prepared and filed with the district court; the 
affidavit raises the issue of appellant's lack of notice. In the 
affidavit, appellant acknowledges that a division of real property 
was accomplished by a Stipulated Judgment, but states that he at no 
time had notice that any money judgment had ever been entered or 
even sought: 
Affiant states that, the ENSIGN COMPANY, being no longer 
involved with SKI PARK CITY WEST, INC., he heard little 
about any of the pending litigation in Utah involving 
the Park City resort until September 28, 1976 at which 
time he was served by a Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff 
with a copy of a document filed in the Superior Court 
for California entitled "Notice of Entry of Sister State 
Judgment." .•. Prior to this time, affiant was unaware 
that any monetary judgment had been entered (or even 
sought) in connection with the Utah action seeking a 
distribution of land. (R. 814, App. 66) (emphasis added). 
A review of the critical events involving the entry of the 
Judgment on Stipulation reveals that prior to the institution of 
this lawsuit, appellant had transferred all of its interests to 
Ski Park City West, Inc. (R. 813, App. 65) and as a result, when 
the suit was filed, appellant did not take an active part but 
relied on the attorneys who appeared for all defendants but were 
hired by Ski Park City west, Inc. (Id). In June of 1971, appellant 
exchanged its stockholdings in Ski Park City West, Inc. for stock 
in another corporation (R. 814, App. 66). 
-4-
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Appellant knew only that a suit had been filed seek a 
division of real property and that this division was accomplished 
in July, 1971 by a Stipulated Judgment (R. 814, App. 66), but 
appellant's general partner had never been served with any judgment 
or other papers in connection with the lawsuit and the defendants, 
counsel had never provided the general partner with any of the 
suit papers. (R. 814-815, App. 67). The first appellant knew that 
any money judgment was authorized or sought was when he was 
served with a Notice of Entry of Sister State Judgment, which 
itself was premised upon the order of April 8, 1975. 
The Ensign affidavit placed all of these facts before 
the district court prior to the entry of the summary judgment. Thi! 
affidavit clearly presents the issue of lack of knowledge of the 
terms of the Judgment on Stipulation, and hence, of necessity, of 
authorization of those terms, especially those terms the Court 
relies upon in its decision. 
Hence, the Court, when it ruled that Appellant failed to 
raise the issue of lack of authority in the district court, failed 
to consider the record made below, and especially the full import 
of the Ensign affidavit. 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests 
this Court to rehear argument on the issue of lack of authorization 
of the Judgment on Stipulation and the due process implications 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
arising therefrom. If this Petition for Rehearing is denied, appellant 
will be faced with a final $98,000.00 J'udgrnent based on a compromise 
of claims that appellant never authorized. 
Respectfully submitted this , -:> 7 1 
__) day of November, 
1978. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
By Lt<~ 
Warren Patten 
By l~L 2 crL 
Charles B. Casper 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
. 7'~ I hereby certify that on the /3 day of November, 
1978, I hereby caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Petition of Appellant for Rehearing and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof to each of 
the following: Don R. Strong, Esq. P. o. Box 124, Springville, 
Utah 84663; Marvin E. Garrett, Esq. 707 Wilshire Boulevard, UCB 
Building, suite 4100, Los Angeles, California 90017; Wendell E. 
Bennett, Esq., 370 East 500 South, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
~<)./. 
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c 
IN THE SUPREME 
Park City Utah Corporation, 
a corporation, et al., 
c ~ 
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH~ 
""' 
-----00000----- ~ 
No. 15410 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
FILED 
v. October 23, 1978 
""-,, 
Ensign Company, a limited 
partnersb.ip,. et al., 
·:Defendants-.and Appellants. Geoffrey :r. Butler, Clerk 
MAUGHAN, :Tustice: 
Defendant appeals from a motion for partial summary judgment wherein 
plaintiff was awarded $98, 000. The judgment is affirmed. No costs awarded. 
All statutory references are to U.C.A., 1953. 
'-
',," 
This present action is the culmination of the efforts of plaintiff, by a 
series of motions, to implement a judgment on stipulation rendered :Tuly 23, 
1971. The judgment by stipulation was predicated on a complaint wherein it was 
alleged a dispute existed between plaintiff and defendants concerning their 
respective interests in certain properties subject to an agreement, which was 
attached to the pleadings as Exhibit A. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment 
wherein the properties would be divided and distributed as contemplated by 
the parties pursuant to the agreement. The defendant, Ensign Company, was a 
limited partnership, with Robert W. Ensign, as the general partner. In this 
present appeal Ensign alone appeals, although there were two other defendants, 
namely, Ski Park City West, !nc. and Aspen Grove, Inc. (the name of which 
was changed to National Property Management, Inc.), two corporations. 
Exhibit A, the agreement attached to the complaint, was dated :Tanuary 24, 
1967, and set fortli the terms for the development of a recreational ski resort 
by Major-Blakeney Co:i:p oration and Robert W. Ensign. The complaint 
alleged Ensign's interest was assigned to Ensign Company and the corporate 
defendants acquired an interest in the property. All of the interest in the 
agreement and to the properties of Major-Blakeney Corporation was assigned 
to plaintiff, Park City Utah Corporation on June 26, 1968. 
The 196 7 agreement provided: 
I 
I 
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5. Ensign shall be responsible for paying any and all 
cash consideration, fees, charges and other costs initially 
and subsequently required to acquire good title to the land 
which will be conveyed through escrows; this to include in-
stallments that become due upon promissory notes secured 
by mortgages or other security instruments, covering 
encumbered land th.us purchased •.. 
To terminate their dispute regarding the l967 agreement and the proper 
division of property acquired pursuant thereto, the parties entered into a judg. 
ment on stipulation. ln addition to awarding each. party specific parcels, tbe 
judgment provided: 
. -V~2''". ,,;~~o:-:· .• -:~~ 
ltiuFurther"Ordered Tb.at for the protection of the 
existing original sellers and third party purchasers the 
defendants shall without restriction or limitation, except 
as herein provided, apply- third party purchasers proceeds 
to :iriginal selle~ ob.Ligations. 
A. On receipt of third party proceeds not heretofore 
assigned and pending disbursements thereof to original 
seller obligations, the defendants shall deposit said pro-
ceeds in a separate trust account, the establishment, 
terms and conditions of withdrawal therefrom to be subject 
to the approval of plaintiff. It is the intent hereof th.at said 
proceeds are to be segregated from the general funds, 
accounts and expenditures of defendants and applied only 
to original seller obligations~ and are to be received and 
held in .trust by the defendants to insure performance of the 
obligations to the original sellers. 
*** 
It Is. Further Ordered That the above stated procedure of 
permitting defendants to apply third party purchaser proceeds 
to original seller obligations shall not be construed or inter-
preted. as a waiver, modification or alteration of any other 
basic. agi:e.eme.nt or ag.ree.raen.ts. between the parties and should 
the defendants fail to perform as herein ordered, this 
payment procedure is without prejudice to plaintiff to 
revoke the same and reinstate the original contractual 
prohibition against said payment procedure. 
It Is Further Ordered That the above stated payment 
procedure does not alter, amend or modify defendants' 
obligations to original sellers or third party purchasers 
and is without prejudice to plaintiff invoking all of its 
rights and remedies against defendants in the event of 
breach or default. 
No. 15410 -2-
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Subsequent to the entry of the judgment defendants d.d t d" h 
. . . . . ' l no isc arge 
their obligations to the ong1nal sellers on certain parcels of land awarded to 
plaintiffs. (It should be interjected that although defendants had the duty to 
pay for all the land in the project, the proceeds from third party sales was to 
be used for this purpose. The land was to be equally divided between plaintiff 
and defendants; each t.hen sold an equal amount of land to third party buyers, 
the proceeds from which would be sufficient to pay for the entire acquisition 
cost.) 
Pursuant to a hearing held on February 27 and 28, 1975, an order of the 
co~rt was·i:sued Ap~il 8, l97.5, .wherein the court ruled the judgment on stipu-
lation was final, valid, and binding. It also ruled it was the duty of the defendants 
to pay and discharge the purchase money obligations on the Land divided to 
plaintiffs. The court further ordered a means to determine the amounts 
currently due and owing upon the original purchase money obligations. The 
court granted plaintiff's motion for Leave to execute as to amounts sufficient to 
discharge the outstanding purchase money obligations for the release of the 
land. Thereafter a writ of execution for the sum of $76, 653. 53 was issued; 
it was returned unsatisfied. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion for a money 
judgment in the sum of $98, 000. According to the motion this amount repre-
sented the sum required to release parcels 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, which should 
have been released by the defendants making the necessary payments as required 
by the judgment on stipulation of 1971, and the court orders of April 8 and 
November 6, 1975. Pursuant to this motioi:i, plaintiff moved for partial 
summary judgment. 
In its motion for summary judgment, plaintiff set forth as grounds 
the judgment on stipulation of July 23, 1971, had been deemed by the court a valid, 
subsisting decree binding upon all parties thereto. The judgment of July 23, 
1971, ordered defendants to discharge the. outstanding purchase money obligations 
encumbering the land awarded to plaintiff, sufficient to cause the release of the 
property to plaintiff and third party purchasers. Defmdants had defaulted on 
these '.lbligations. The court had confirmed the foregoing facts, and had granted 
plaintiff's prior motion to execute, under the judgment of 1971. Defendants b.ad 
at no time sought.to meet their obligations pursuant to the judgment and orders. 
The court ruled on July 21, l977, there remained one factual issue for deter-
mination, the current money amount due from defendants to plaintiffs for the . 
formers' default, under the 1971 judgment, and subsequent orders based on it. 
Neither defendants nor any party whatever could refute that certain real property 
awarded to plaintiff went th.rough a foreclosure proceeding as a result ol de!endants' 
failure to meet their obligations under the 1971 judgment; also, it was necessary 
to raise $98, 000 cash to recover most of the foreclosed land. Such was dis-
closed by the affidavits annexed to the motion. Plaintiff concluded with a 
claim there was no material issue of fact to litigate, the judgment and orders 
had described defendants' legal duty thereunder, and plaintiff was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of Law. The affidavits included with the motion established 
the sums paid to recover parcels 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 from the purchasers at 
the foreclosure sale. 
No. 15410 -3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
c ( 
Defendant, Ensign, filed an objection to the motion for partial surnmar· 
judgment and an affidavit. His claim was Ensign Company had sold all its int)' 
to the property in question to Ski Park City West, Inc., in the autumn of 1969'.
1 
Ensign had had no dealings with the property or monies received or financial 
transactions involving the property since the autumn of 1969. Ensign further 
claimed he was familiar with the land in question, and in his opinion it was not 
worth $98, 000. Ensign claimed there were a substantial number of disputed 
facts, making inappropriate a summary judgment. He urged, if any of the 
defendants ha.d engaged in conduct of misusing the funds collected, there was 
a factual dispute a.s to Ensign's involvement. 
At the hearing on the motion Ensign asserted as factual issues: (1) 
Wa.s a. trust."account established by defendants; (2) Were monies collected and 
were they applied or diverted~ and (3) What was the value of the property in 
pa.reels 8, ·9, 10,. 11, and IZ-. 
Plaintiff responded that it was irrelevant whether the money was, in fact 
paid into the trust fund. Defendants had such a duty; and if they failed to per· 
form, they were to hold plaintiff harmless from damages and allow plaintiff to 
clear title. Pl.a.inti.ff asserted it had no knowlesige as to what happened to the 
money collected from. third party purchasers, such was an issue to be resolved 
among the defendants. The facts established proved the vendors to the parties 
foreclosed their mortgages and to protect plaintiff's interest, plaintiff paid 
$98, 000. Under th~ 1971 judgment, defendants were responsible. 
The trial court granted plaintiff's motion, and awarded judgment in the 
sum of $98, 000 to plaintiff. The court further affirmed its previol1s order of 
April 8, 1975, granting plaintiff's motion for leave to execute. 
Defendant, EnsigDp describes in his brief the original action as a. com· 
plaint seeking partition of real estate. Partition is a statutory action to which 
there mu!Jt be strict adherence as set forth in Chapter 39, Title 78. A review 
of the pleadings indicates the complaint did not include al! persons with an 
interest in the property. such a.s, those having any interest in, or Liens 0£ 
record, by mortgage, -judgment, or otherwise. 1 Rather, as previously noted,~ 
action was in the nature of a declaratory judgment to determine the rights of 
the parties pursuant to their agreement of l967. 
On appeal, Ensign contends the trial court adopted an erroneous inter· 
pretation of the judgment of .Tuly Z3, 1971. Specifically, this judgment imposed 
upon defendants a duty in al! events to pay for the land awarded to plaintiffs. 
This interpretation was the basis to authorize a money judgment br damages 
awarded t.o plaintiff. 
Ensign argues the terms of the 1971 judgment are ambiguous in that the" 
terms "original seller obligations" "defendants' obligations to original sellers 
are indefinite. -
1. See Sections 78-39-2, 3, 5. 
No. 15410 -4-
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c (. 
. Further, Ensign asserts the 1971 judgment applied .:mly to that land Crom 
which there were proceeds, and there was no evidence to · d" t th 
. . in ica e ere we re any 
such proceeds as to the land tn question. He claims the J"udg t . 
men reqw.res the 
existence of proceeds from third party sales contracts for parcels 8. 9, lO, 
11, 12. The record affirmatively shows that all of the third a t h p r y pare ase 
contracts dealt with land other than that foreclosed by the bank The " 
• re.ore, 
Ensi.gn urg_es no duty arose as to this land as no proceeds were available to be 
applied to it. Defendant further urges the judgment applied only to the extent 
tbeproceeds had not heretofore been assigned, and whether there had been such 
an assignment was an unresolved issue of fact. 
An ambiguous judgment. is subject to construction according to the 
rules that apply to all written instruments: - · 
:..;Yt-
-••• In construing a court ord~r or judgment, resort 
· may be had to th~ pleadings and fil'idings. 
Where construction is called for it is the duty of the 
court to interpret. an ambiguity which will make the judg-
ment more reasonable, effective, conclusive, and one 
which brings the judgment into harmony with the facts and 
the law .••• 2 
If the language of a judgment be clear and unambiguous, it must be 
enforced as it speaks. However, when the meaning is obscure or ambiguous, 
the entire record may be resorted to for the purpose of construing the judgment. 3 
Here, the trial court ruled it was the duty and obligation of defendants to 
obtain the release from monetary encumbrances of the real property awarded 
to plaintiff in the 1971 decree. The three defendants, in fact, failed to dis-
charge the financial obligations on parcels 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, the property awarded 
to plaintiff by the 1971 judgment, with a resulting foreclosure of same pursuant 
to decree. Plaintiff's judgment assignee recovered back all but two acres of 
parcels 8 through 12 inclusive by paying $98, 000 cash to judicial sale.pur-
chasers at sheriff's foreclosure sale. The factual issues concerning questions 
of the foreclosure and the recovery payment of $98, 000 are materially uncon-
troverted by defendants. The trial court further ruled the prior May 15, 1975, 
Writ of Execution was superseded and modified to reflect the current amount 
due from defendants to plaintiff and its judgment assignee. 
The trial court did not err in its Interpretation of the 1971 judgment. 
Therein it is clearly specified that the payment procedure was not to be deemed 
a waiver of any of the basic agreements between the parties and that the payment 
2. Moon Lake Water Users Association v. Hanson, Utah, 535 P. 2d IZ6Z; 
1264 (1975). 
3. Westbrook v. Lea General Hospital, 85 N.M. 191, 510 P.2d 515 (1973). 
No. 15410 -5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
c (, 
procedure did not alter, amend, or modify defendant's obligations to original 
sellers. When these provisions are construed in conjunction with plaintiff's 
complaint including the attached Exhibit A, the 1967 agreement, the asserted 
ambiguity in the 1971 judgment is resolved. 
Defendart:, Ensign, further contends he is not bound by the 1971 
judgment on stipulation on the ground he had not authorized his attorney to do so, 
Defendant raises this matter for the first time on appeal. The record herein 
includes the hearing held on February 27 and 28, 1975; counsel specifically 
represented his appearance was for defendant, Ensign. Counsel did not 
assert at that time Ensign had not authorized the stipulation. Thereafter, 
Ensign has been represented in several hearings including the one for summary 
judgment, anci such an assertion has not been ~ade. Ensign did not make such 
a claim in hi8' affidavit to support his pleading in opposition to the motion for 
summary-judgment. Where a party neither raises an issue in its pleadings nor 
presents it ta the trial court, the issue cannot be considered for the first time 
on appeal. 4 
Defendants final point on appeal concerning the order of April 8, l975, 
is without merit, since the matters resolved therein were reconsidered at the 
time the summary judgment was granted. 
WE CONCUR: 
A. H. Ellett. Chief Justice 
J. Allan Crockett, Justice 
D. Frank Wilkins, Justice 
Gordon R. Hall, Justice 
4. Hanover Limited v. Fields, Utah, 568 P. 2d 751 (1977). 
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